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Abstract  
Since 2001, foreign investors have been permitted to acquire minority ownership stakes 
in China’s banks. This paper assesses whether there is any evidence of a cost efficiency 
payoff in those banks that have taken on foreign investment. Data Envelopment Analysis 
is first used to generate measures of cost efficiency for China’s banks over the period 
2001-2006. A second stage regression is then performed to determine whether foreign 
investment has an impact on cost efficiency. The results indicate a positive impact, 
although one that is only marginally significant. Policy implications are discussed.     
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Since the Open Door Policy was embarked upon in 1979, China has emerged as a leading 
host of foreign investment. This foreign investment has not, however, been evenly 
distributed across economic sectors. While the Open Door Policy liberalized foreign 
ownership in some sectors, notably manufacturing, the services sector, including banking, 
remained largely off limits. This state of affairs changed considerably after China joined 
the WTO in 2001. Firstly, China committed to extending national treatment to foreign 
banks by the end of 2006. Secondly, foreign investors were given permission to acquire 
minority ownership stakes in China’s banks. Current regulations permit a single foreign 
investor to acquire up to a 20 per cent ownership stake and total foreign ownership can 
reach 25 per cent. In 2001, HSBC became the first foreign investor to take advantage of 
these changes when it negotiated the purchase of an 8 per cent stake in Bank of Shanghai. 
The list of banks to have since brought in “strategic foreign investors”, as the Chinese 
government labels such investors, has expanded considerably and now includes four of 
China’s five largest banks (Table 1).  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
For foreign investors, acquiring an ownership stake in a Chinese bank provides them with 
access to one of the world’s fastest growing banking markets. Total deposits in financial 
institutions in China grew from RMB14.3 trillion at year-end 2001 to RMB37.0 trillion at 
the end of the second quarter of 2007. While foreign banks also now have the option of 
establishing their own branch networks in China, this is a slow and costly process.   2
Regulations issued at the end of 2006 state that for a foreign bank to be extended national 
treatment and so to obtain access to the local RMB market, it must establish a bank 
incorporated in China. This requires registered capital of at least RMB1 billion 
(equivalent to about $US135 million). Moreover, it must then allocate an additional 
RMB100 million (equivalent to about $US13.5 million) for each branch it opens. Such 
capital requirements mean that currently only the largest and most committed foreign 
banks are seeking to build their own branch networks with the hope of competing in the 
retail market. Even these banks are tending to adopt a duel-pronged strategy. For 
example, HSBC has established the most extensive branch network amongst foreign 
banks operating in China. As of mid-2007, this network consisted of 15 branches and 25 
sub-branches. By way of comparison, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 
China’s largest domestic bank, had more than 21,000 branches. This gap helps to explain 
why at the same time as building up its own branch network, HSBC has also acquired 
minority ownership stakes in local banks such as Bank of Shanghai and Bank of 
Communications (BOCOM).  
 
From the perspective of China’s banks, foreign investment is a potential source of fresh 
capital and advanced technology. The need for China’s banks to improve their efficiency 
is mounting now that they are operating in an increasingly competitive and liberalized 
banking environment. It was not so long ago that fears were expressed that their poor 
efficiency levels might cause them to collapse under the weight of competition from 
foreign banks, post-WTO entry (Bonin and Huang, 2001). Historically, China’s banks 
have been undercapitalized (Lardy, 1998) and while the central government has shown a   3
willingness to inject fresh capital into the biggest banks (see Ma, 2007), many others 
have been driven to seek alternative sources. The need to act has been heightened by the 
banking regulator, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), requiring that all 
banks meet a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent, the international standard, by 
2007. Advanced technology can be defined broadly to include assistance with strategic 
management decision-making, operational practices and financial product innovations. At 
the time of injecting fresh capital, it has become common for minority foreign investors 
to also commit to “technical assistance packages”, such as the ANZ Banking Group 
agreed to when it recently took a 20 per cent stake in Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 
(China Daily Online, 2006).  
 
This paper considers whether an efficiency payoff is evident in those banks that have 
taken on minority foreign ownership.  While Leigh and Podpiera (2006) and Hope and 
Hu (2006) took stock of the rise of minority foreign investment in China’s banks and 
discussed the potential for it to help reform the banking system, to our knowledge there 
has not yet been any quantitative assessment of its efficiency impact to date. An empirical 
assessment is particularly important because in theoretical terms the impact of minority 
foreign investment on efficiency is unclear. On the one hand, efficiency may well be 
bolstered by the injection of fresh capital and advanced technology. On the other hand, 
because foreign investors have only been permitted to acquire minority stakes that often 
do not provide them with any management control, the size of the capital injection has 
been relatively modest and this might also have had the effect of reducing their ability 
and incentive to transfer technology. From their position as minority owners, it would be   4
difficult for foreign investors to retain control over technology they transferred and they 
would also not get to capture the majority of benefits if their invested Chinese bank did 
become more efficient. Other issues that arise are whether the technology that foreign 
investors have is appropriate to the Chinese market and the challenges that are involved 
in integrating two very different corporate cultures. Indeed, there is already a precedent 
for such concerns. In 1995, when China Construction Bank (CCB) and Morgan Stanley 
joined forces to create the joint-venture, investment-banking firm, China International 
Capital Corporation (CICC), it was considered a coup for both parties. Morgan Stanley’s 
35 per cent stake was considered more than sufficient to provide it with the ability and 
incentive to transfer the technology the Chinese side was lacking. It also gave Morgan 
Stanley an enviable point of entry into a fast growing investment banking market. 
However, shortly after CICC’s establishment, management clashes emerged and the 
relationship degenerated to the point of collapse (McGregor, 2005). In 2002, Morgan 
Stanley was left with little choice but to hand over complete management control to its 
Chinese partner and while it retains its equity stake, this has been converted to an entirely 
passive holding. Bringing in minority foreign investors is also not the only channel 
through which China’s banks can acquire fresh capital. For example, ICBC, CCB, Bank 
of China (BOC), BOCOM, CITIC Bank, Industrial Bank (IB), Bank of Beijing, Bank of 
Nanjing and Bank of Ningbo all successfully raised multi-billion dollar amounts on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006 and 2007.  Banks can also sell ownership stakes to 
domestic investors, such as when the Ping An Insurance Group beat out numerous 
foreign investors for the ownership of Shenzhen Commercial Bank (IHT, 2006). China is 
also particularly fortunate in that it can count amongst its territories an international   5
financial center in Hong Kong, SAR, through which it can gain access to world financial 
markets and numerous Chinese banks have taken this route in recent years. 
 
Thus, whether there has been an overall and discernable efficiency payoff in those banks 
that have taken on minority foreign investment is an empirical question and one that 
awaits confirmation.  This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. Section 2 provides a 
brief review of some of the key existing studies that examine the impact of foreign 
ownership on bank performance. Section 3 outlines the methodology we use to derive 
measures of efficiency for China’s banks and presents the results. Section 4 assesses 
whether there is a statistical relationship between these measures of efficiency and 
foreign investment and the policy implications associated with results are discussed. 
Section 5 summarizes the findings.  
 
2. Literature Review – foreign ownership and bank performance 
An earlier and often-cited study that considers the impact of foreign ownership, amongst 
other factors, on bank performance is Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). Using 
international panel data covering the period 1988-1995, they found that foreign-owned 
banks – defined as those banks in which foreigners held more than 50 per cent of equity – 
performed better than domestically-owned banks in developing countries but worse in 
developed countries.  In the developing country context, it was conjectured that the 
superior performance of foreign-owned banks might be attributable to them enjoying a 
technology advantage over their domestic counterparts and because they might also be 
exempt from unfavorable domestic banking regulations. In the developed country context,   6
it was conjectured that foreign-owned banks no longer enjoy a technological advantage 
over their competitors and they might suffer from information deficiencies relative to 
their domestic competitors. A more recent study that also utilizes international panel data 
is Lensink and Naaborg (2007). In this study a negative relationship was found to exist 
between the proportion of a bank’s equity that was foreign-owned and performance. In 
explaining this result, the authors draw on the “home field advantage” theory of Berger, 
et al. (2000). This theory posits that banks with more domestic ownership will be at a 
competitive advantage because of the distance between the principal and the agent and 
differences in language, culture and regulatory and supervisory structures.   
 
While results from studies using international panel data are interesting, perhaps more 
relevant to the Chinese context are several recent studies that have been conducted using 
data from other transitional economies. Bonin, et al. (2005) considered the impact of 
ownership type on bank performance using a dataset that covered the period 1996-2000 
for 11 Eastern and Central European transitional economies. Aside from specifically 
focusing on transitional economies, another innovation of this study is that bank 
performance was measured using efficiency scores generated by Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) rather than simple accounting ratios such as the return on assets (ROA).  
A second stage regression was then performed in attempt to explain the variation in these 
efficiency scores. It was found that banks that were majority foreign-owned – defined as 
those banks in which foreigners held more than 50 per cent of equity - were more 
efficient than majority domestic privately-owned banks, which in turn were more 
efficient than majority domestic government-owned banks. Grigorian and Manole (2006)   7
considered the determinants of bank performance in 17 Eastern and Central European 
economies over the period 1995-1998.  They also first compute efficiency scores - except 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) rather than SFA - before performing a second 
stage regression.  The impact of foreign ownership was captured using a dummy variable 
that took a value of one when more than 30 per cent of a bank’s equity was foreign-
owned. The 30 per cent cut-off point was chosen on the basis that foreign owners need 
not hold more than 50 per cent of a bank’s equity to exert a controlling influence. Foreign 
ownership was again found to be positively related to bank efficiency.  Findings of the 
likes of Bonin, et al. (2005) and Grigorian and Manole (2006) serve to provide optimism 
regarding the impact that foreign investment might have had in the Chinese context. They 
do not, however, allow strong a priori expectations to be formed given that no Chinese 
bank has sold more than 30 per cent of its equity to foreign investors. As can been seen in 
Table 1, the largest foreign ownership share is 25 per cent and it has typically been less 
than 20 per cent. 
 
In the case of China, we are not aware on any published study that has sought to 
investigate the efficiency impact of minority foreign investment since 2001. Chen, et al. 
(2005) used DEA to calculate efficiency scores for China’s banks over the period 1993-
2000 but the possible impact of ownership type on these efficiency scores was not 
considered. Fu and Heffernan (2007) used SFA to calculate efficiency scores for the big 
four state-owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period 1985-2002 but a 
subsequent second stage regression simply included a dummy that took a value of one if 
the bank was a joint-stock bank. In the closest study to ours, Berger, et al. (2007) used   8
SFA to calculate efficiency scores for China’s banks based on a dataset that covered the 
period 1994-2003. These efficiency scores were then regressed on various dummies of 
ownership type and size. Four main ownership types were considered including majority 
state-owned banks, majority domestic privately-owned banks, majority foreign-owned 
banks and banks with no majority ownership. Majority ownership was defined as these 
owners holding more than 50 per cent of equity. Relative to majority domestic privately-
owned banks, it was found that majority state-owned banks were significantly less 
efficient, majority foreign-owned banks were significantly more efficient and banks with 
no majority ownership were not significantly different. As with Bonin, et al (2005) and 
Grigorian and Manole (2006), it is difficult to draw implications from these results for the 
potential impact of minority foreign investment. Another potential problem is that the 
regulatory environment differed markedly amongst banks of the above ownership types.  
Majority foreign-owned banks, for example, did not compete in the retail market because 
they were not permitted to collect RMB deposits from Chinese individuals and 
companies. Thus, including all of the above ownership types in the same frontier analysis 
may be problematic because SFA and DEA generate efficiency scores by comparing 
banks with each other. Aside from the four main ownership types mentioned above, the 
authors also further disaggregated ownership into majority state-owned banks with 
minority foreign investment and majority domestic privately-owned banks with minority 
foreign investment. The coefficients to these ownership dummies were positive and 
significant. However, how much weight can be assigned to these results is not clear given 
that the dataset used only covered the period to 2003. As can be seen in Table 1, at this 
time only three Chinese banks had taken on minority foreign investment.
1  
                                                 
1 Berger, et al. (2007) notes that prior to 2001, international organizations such as the Asian Development   9
 
3. Measuring Bank Efficiency 
In order to evaluate the impact of foreign investment, an appropriate measure of bank 
performance must first be arrived at. Accounting-based performance ratios such as the 
ROA are the simple choice but as noted by O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002), at 
least as measures of efficiency, which is what we have in mind in this paper when 
thinking about bank performance, such measures are theoretically deficient because they 
are only partial in nature. That is, a bank may appear to be performing well based on one 
measure but poorly with respect to another measure. To test whether such partial 
measures give consistent indications of performance amongst China’s banks, we 
collected data on four popular accounting-based measures - the ROA, the impaired loan 
ratio (ILR), the total capital ratio (CR) and the cost to income ratio (CIR). Data relating to 
these variables was obtained from the Bankscope database for a large sample of Chinese 
banks. The dataset we use in this paper is discussed in more detail later in the context of 
our preferred measure of bank performance. The correlation matrix for the above 
accounting-based performance measures is given in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
 
The concerns of O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002) are very much in evidence. 
The correlation coefficient between performance measures is typically low and in the one 
case where it is greater than 0.5, the correlation is actually negative.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Bank and International Finance Corporation took small equity stakes in three Chinese banks. However, this 
type of investment was different in nature to the sale of minority stakes to strategic foreign investors that 
only became permissible after 2001.    10
Rather than using partial performance measures, we instead make use of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a technique that can provide a more complete measure of 
a firm’s efficiency and one that has already been used extensively in the banking 
literature. While DEA has predominantly been applied in the context of developed 
countries (see Burger and Humphrey, 1997), it has also been used to measure bank 
performance in transitional economies, including China (Chen, et al., 2005) and those in 
Eastern and Central Europe (Grigorian and Manole, 2006). DEA first requires the 
specification and collection of data relating to outputs, inputs (costs) and input prices for 
a sample of firms. It then uses linear programming to generate a frontier of “best 
practice” or “efficiency” from amongst this group of firms. Where a particular firm lies 
relative to this frontier determines its own efficiency score. If a firm lies on the frontier – 
that is, data from this firm forms part of the frontier - it is deemed to be fully efficient and 
will receive an efficiency score of one.  DEA can calculate scores relating to technical 
efficiency (TE), allocative efficiency (AE) and cost efficiency (CE). A firm is said to be 
technically efficient if it produces a given set of outputs using the smallest possible 
amount of inputs. It is said to be allocatively efficient if it selects an input mix that 
minimizes the cost of producing this given set of outputs. It is said to be cost efficient if it 
is both technically and allocatively efficient. Since CE is the encompassing efficiency 
measure and ultimately determines how competitive a bank will be, it is the measure of 
efficiency we use in this paper.
2 
 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed discussion of these various efficiency concepts, the interested reader could consult 
O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002) for an excellent review.   11
The DEA model we use follows that of Chen, et al. (2005). Banks are deemed to be 
producing three outputs - loans, deposits and non-interest income. The reason that loans 
and non-interest income are included as outputs is relatively straightforward. However, 
the inclusion of deposits is less so. On the one hand, deposits might be considered an 
input in producing loans and other assets, not as an output in itself. On the other hand, as 
Chen, et al. (2005) point out, deposits also provide liquidity, safekeeping and payments 
services to depositors. Cavallo and Rossi (2001) suggest dealing with this problem by 
taking a dual approach in which the volume of deposits is considered an output while the 
cost of deposits - the bank’s interest expenses - is considered an input cost. Non-interest 
expenses are included as a second input cost. The price of interest expenses is calculated 
as interest expenses divided by deposits. The price of non-interest expenses is calculated 
as non-interest expenses divided by assets.  The latter input cost and price is admittedly 
less than ideal as it encompasses several inputs (e.g., labour and capital). However, 
unfortunately more disaggregated data for China’s banks is not available.   
 
This model is estimated using the DEA software, DEAP Version 2.1 (Coelli, 1996). The 
variable returns to scale option is checked given that there can be no presumption that the 
banks in our dataset are already operating at an optimal scale.  
 
All data used in the DEA was obtained from the Bankscope database. We use pooled data 
covering the period 2001-2006. Prior to this time, foreign investment in China’s banks 
was not permitted and hence there are no benefits to be gained from extending the dataset 
further back. All nominal data was converted to real terms using the GDP deflator.   12
Pooled rather than cross-sectional data was used because through pooled data we are able 
to obtain 267 observations for the DEA. The sample comprises the big four, ex-state-
owned banks, the dozen or so national and regional joint-stock commercial banks and 
more than 50 city commercial banks (see Table 3). Unlike Chen, et al. (2005), data 
relating to trust and investment companies was not included. This is because in our 
evaluation these financial institutions differ considerably from commercial banks in 
nature (see Lardy, et al., 1997). Given that DEA determines a particular firm’s efficiency 
score by benchmarking it against other firms in the sample, including data relating to trust 
and investment companies might bias the results. Data on foreign banks in China also did 
not form part of the data set because it was not available in Bankscope and also because it 
was not until the end of 2006 that some foreign banks began to be extended national 
treatment.  
 
The average CE score for each bank in our sample is presented in Table 3. We stress that 
caution should be exercised when interpreting the CE score of an individual bank or 
when comparing CE scores amongst banks because of differences in data availability (see 
column 2). For example, China Bohai Bank, a new bank formed with capital contributed 
by both domestic and foreign investors, only has data available for 2006. Its CE score for 
this year is low at just 0.19 but this might simply reflect start-up costs that have not yet 
had sufficient time to produce outputs rather than being evidence of inefficiency in a 
more fundamental sense. Changes in the external environment facing banks might also 
have an impact on CE scores in one year versus another. For example, in recent years the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), China’s central bank, has been increasing the bank   13
reserve requirement in order to control the growth in the money supply. This might 
impact upon a bank’s ability to produce outputs such as loans. While we later control for 
the impact of such changes on CE, Table 3 simply presents the raw DEA output. Finally, 
we also caution against interpreting a low CE score as being evidence that a bank is 
poorly managed. This may be the case but not necessarily. For example, a bank’s CE 
score may be impacted upon by government regulations. By way of illustration, city 
commercial banks are restricted to opening branches within their own city’s boundaries 
(KPMG, 2007). This might have an impact on their CE scores relative to national-wide 
banks, particularly for those that are located in smaller, less prosperous cities, because 
they are less able to achieve economies of scale and spread risk. Similarly, larger banks 
may receive a high CE score not because they are particularly well managed but rather 
simply because they benefit from economies of scale. Again, later we control for the 
impact of such possible influences on CE scores but the data in Table 3 does not.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Although some banks received a CE score of 1 in some years, Table 3 shows that no bank 
could claim to have been at the efficiency frontier across all the years for which data was 
available.  With the mean CE score being 0.63, DEA points to the average bank still 
having considerable scope for efficiency improvements. Specifically, the average bank 
could reduce its input costs by 37 per cent if it adopted the best practice from amongst its 
high-performing peers and became both TE and AE. One factor likely influencing the 
sizeable scope for efficiency improvements is the restricted competition that has occurred   14
in China’s banking sector to date.  For example, in the period covered by the DEA, 
foreign banks were barred from competing with domestic banks in the retail market and 
city commercial banks, although many in number, largely did not compete with each 
other because of geographical restrictions on their operations.  
 
4. Foreign Investment and Cost Efficiency 
Following the approach of O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002) and Gregorian and 
Manole (2006), a second stage regression is now performed to determine if foreign 
investment has explanatory power with respect to CE.  Given that CE is bounded between 
0 and 1, a TOBIT regression model rather than standard OLS is used. The TOBIT model 
is specified as follows – 
 
it it it it it it D D CB LIST ASSETS B FI CE ε α α β β β α + + + + + + + + = ) 2006 ( ... ) 2001 ( 6 1 4 3 2 1 0  
           ( 1 )  
•  CEit is the CE of bank i in year t. 
•  FIit  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if bank i had foreign investment 
in year t. If foreign investment has resulted in efficiency payoffs, the coefficient to 
FIit should be positive and significant.  
•  ASSETSit  is the real value of total assets (in RMB billion) of bank i in year t.  
This is included as a control variable to capture the fact that larger banks may reap 
efficiency benefits from, for example, economies of scale or being better able to 
spread risks. The coefficient is expected to be positive.   15
•  LISTit is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if bank i was publicly listed in 
year t. This is included as a control variable to capture the fact that listed 
companies may reap efficiency benefits from better corporate governance, as has 
been suggested by some academics within China (China Daily, 2007). The 
coefficient is expected to be positive. 
•  CBit is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if bank i was a city commercial 
bank in year t. This is included as a control variable to capture that the fact that, 
for example, government regulations and policies may differ between national-
wide banks and city commercial banks and this might impact on their efficiency. 
The coefficient is expected to be negative. 
•  D’s are time dummies for the years 2001-2006 to account for the fact that pooled 
data was used in the DEA and, for example, government regulations and policies 
affecting efficiency may change from year to year.  
•  ε is an error term. 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for the above independent variables. The highest 
correlation coefficient is just -0.55 and so no multicolinearity problems are expected.  
Basic descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5. The means values indicate that the 
majority of China’s banks are still without minority foreign investment and are not 
publicly listed.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
Insert Table 5 here     16
 
Before presenting the TOBIT regression output, it is worth commenting on the possibility 
that FI, the independent variable of most interest, and CE, our assumed dependent 
variable, might suffer from an endogeneity problem. For example, foreign investors may 
be reluctant to invest in inefficient banks, in which case causality would run from CE to 
FI. However, endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem in our model for several reasons. 
The first reason is a technical one. CE is an efficiency measure that we have constructed. 
It has not been available to foreign investors when making investment decisions in the 
same way that partial efficiency measures based on accounting ratios such as the ROA 
have been. Endogeneity might still be a problem if CE were highly correlated with those 
partial efficiency measures but Table 6 shows this is not the case.  
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
The second reason is based on the motivations of foreign investors. Observation strongly 
suggests that what foreign investors most want is market access, not necessarily a bank 
that is already efficient. A poignant example here is the case of Guangdong Development 
Bank (GDB). In 2005, GDB was all but insolvent and the central and provincial 
authorities were reluctant to provide it with fresh capital. As a result, GDB sought to 
bring in foreign investors. In early 2006, a Citigroup-led consortium began aggressively 
pursuing an 85 per cent stake. Citigroup itself was seeking a 40 per cent stake – more 
than double the regulatory maximum that a single foreign investor could acquire. At the 
same time, a consortium led by another foreign investor, Société Générale, also made a   17
competing bid. In commenting on the Citigroup proposal, Business Week (23/01/2006) 
observed that if the deal did receive regulatory approval, GDB, 
“…would certainly need a complete overhaul in lending practices, information 
technology, and customer service. But once it cleaned house, Citi could make a go of 
distributing its array of loan and credit card products and build a nationwide branch 
network.” 
 
That is, GDB was far from being considered efficient, but its existing branch network of 
520-plus branches made it attractive to foreign investors nonetheless.
3 
 
Another independent variable that might appear to suffer from an endogenity problem is 
LIST. That is, rather than whether a bank is listed or not being a determinant of CE via 
the channel of corporate governance, CE might determine whether which banks can list. 
However, once again, the partial efficiency measures that the regulatory authorities use to 
assess applications for listing (e.g., profitability, capital adequacy) are not those we use in 
our model to measure efficiency.   
 
The TOBIT model is estimated using the econometric software package, EVIEWS 5.0. 
The Huber / White robust covariance option is checked to ensure that standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  Table 7 presents the regression output.   
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
 
                                                 
3 In late 2006, a Citigroup-led consortium did win the bid for an 85 per cent equity stake in GDB. To do so 
however, Citigroup itself was forced to reduce its own stake to 20 per cent - .the regulatory maximum for a 
single foreign investor. Other domestic institutions made up the remaining 65 per cent.    18
While the R
2 indicates that the overall explanatory power of the model is modest, several 
of the variables that were included out of a specific interest emerge as being significant. 
With the exception of CB, which has a very small and insignificant coefficient, the 
coefficients to all other independent variables take their expected signs. Discussed in 
more detail later, the coefficient to FI is positive and narrowly misses statistical 
significance at the 10 per cent level. The coefficient to ASSETS is positive and significant 
at the 1 per cent level, thus confirming that larger banks tend to be more efficient than 
smaller ones. This finding has potentially important policy implications, although we do 
not discuss them in detail here because our focus is on FI. For example, the regulations 
that confine city commercial banks to operating within their own city’s boundaries is 
likely to be damaging to their efficiency because it prevents many from achieving 
economies of scale and effectively spreading risk. Another example is that efficiency 
might be boosted if consolidation amongst China’s many banks was encouraged. The 
coefficient to LIST is also positive and significant at the 5 per cent level, thus pointing to 
public listing being a potentially useful channel through which corporate governance in 
China’s banks might be improved. The time dummies are insignificant.   
 
Returning to the coefficient to FI, the result deserves comment on two fronts – firstly, 
why the coefficient might miss out on higher levels of significance, and secondly, why 
the coefficient is nonetheless positive and nearly double the size of its standard error.  
 
One obvious candidate to explain why FI is not significant at higher levels is that foreign 
investors have been restricted to minority ownership stakes. Theory and existing   19
empirical evidence in other countries’ banking sectors does suggest that foreign 
investment will often be accompanied by a technology transfer. However, the ability and 
incentive that foreign investors have to transfer technology will be strongest when they 
have majority, or at least controlling stakes. Of course, the Chinese government has more 
considerations to take into account when setting the regulatory environment surrounding 
foreign investment than just efficiency. For example, allowing foreign investors to take 
controlling stakes might lead to job losses, and the social costs of these job losses might 
be deemed to outweigh any efficiency gains. The Chinese government would also be 
aware that it will take time for foreign banks to establish branch networks that will allow 
them to compete more effectively with Chinese banks in the retail market. Thus, more 
dramatic changes in the regulatory environment such as allowing foreign investors to take 
controlling stakes may not be considered necessary because Chinese banks do not need to 
raise their efficiency to the level of international best practice overnight. The marginal 
significance of FI might also reflect the fact that the impact of foreign investment is one 
that is net of many factors, as alluded to in section 1.  
 
The most compelling explanation of why the coefficient to FI is nonetheless positive, and 
only just misses out on significance at the 10 per cent level, relates to technology transfer. 
This is because the capital contribution made by foreign investors has been modest and if 
it is just fresh capital that China’s banks need, this can also be obtained from domestic 
sources. The reasons that foreign investors may at least transfer some technology and 
commit to “technical assistance packages” from their position of only being minority 
owners are several. Firstly, even if they do not retain control over the technology they   20
transfer or get to capture the majority of benefits from their Chinese invested bank 
becoming more efficient, the sheer scale of China’s banking sector might still be 
sufficiently large to compensate them for doing so. Foreign investors would also be 
aware that if they do not transfer technology while their foreign investor competitors do, 
their invested Chinese bank is likely to lose relative competitiveness. Secondly, foreign 
investors may consider that they also receive a technology transfer in the form of local 
knowledge that compensates them for any technology transfer they make, at least in part. 
This local knowledge might be put to good use when building their own branch networks. 
Thirdly, foreign investors might look upon transferring technology as a way to build their 
reputation with Chinese banks and the Chinese government. Even if the short-term 
payoffs that accrue to them from transferring technology are limited, the long-term 
returns may be more substantial and those investors with good reputations will be best 
positioned to capture these returns. Fourthly, Chinese banks are often in a strong 
negotiating position to extract concessions regarding technology transfer. As the 
experience of GDB highlighted, even poorly performing banks often find themselves 
being courted by multiple suitors. Finally, the positive relationship between FI and CE 
might also be as a result of those banks taking on foreign investment being more eager 
students, at least on average.  That is, those banks that take on foreign investment have a 
willingness to improve their efficiency but lack the knowledge to do so, and hence when 
technology is transferred it diffuses with minimal impediment throughout the 
organization.    
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
   21
In 2001, the Chinese government began opening up the domestic banking sector to 
foreign investment. Aside from making entry by foreign banks more attractive by 
offering national treatment, foreign investors were also given the opportunity to take 
minority ownership stakes in China’s banks. Numerous local banks now have minority 
foreign ownership, including four of the five largest. This paper sought to assess whether 
an efficiency payoff was evident in those banks that have taken on foreign investment. 
DEA was first used to generate cost efficiency estimates for China’s banks over the 
period 2001-2006. A second stage TOBIT regression analysis was then performed in an 
attempt to determine whether foreign investment had explanatory power with respect to 
cost efficiency. A positive and marginally significant relationship was found to exist 
between foreign investment and cost efficiency. Other variables such as size and whether 
or not a bank was publicly listed were significant at higher levels.  
 
Now that foreign banks can establish their own branch networks in China, the banking 
sector will be characterized by steadily increasing levels of competition, particularly in 
financial centers such as Shanghai. Thus, the pressure on China’s banks to improve their 
efficiency will only mount. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that taking on 
minority foreign investors can be a useful strategy to help achieve this. However, to the 
extent that improving the efficiency of China’s banks is considered by the Chinese 
government to be important, the results also suggest that other factors may be more 
fundamental. Banking regulators may also wish to consider removing the geographical 
constraints that currently apply to city commercial banks and promoting consolidation in 
the banking sector more generally. Facilitating the public listing of more banks might   22
also act to raise their efficiency by improving corporate governance.   23
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